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The growth and development of democratic regimes across the globe has been of 
particular interest to political scientists over the last several decades.  The question of 
what is an appropriate and relevant regime depends on various aspects of people’s 
political ideals.  Mozambique is one such nation wherein democratic developments have 
been recent and somewhat successful.  This thesis focuses firstly on the views and 
political ideals of rural dwellers, and secondly on generational differences in political 
ideals and views on regime legitimacy at the local level.  It suggests youth and the elders 
have different views concerning how they should be ruled and what constitutes a 
legitimate political regime.  At the local level, there are manifestations of the central 
democratic regime and the historically traditional regime.  Rural youth consider the 
democratic regime to be legitimate and the traditional regime to be incompatible with 
their ideals.  In their opinion, the existing traditional regime is outdated and irrelevant.  
Older adults in rural areas, in contrast to the youth, are aware of the duality in regime-
types at the local level, but believe there is a place in the community for both to exist.  In 
the opinion of the adults, both regimes are compatible with their ideals and are thus 
legitimate.  If these two significant segments of Mozambican society – rural youth and 
rural elders - hold strongly opposing views concerning what constitutes a legitimate 
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Table 1. Focus groups (The * indicates the focus group that was not used for data 
purposes because, one, the age spread was to broad and, second, the cabo 
was not present with the group but remained within earshot, causing the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The growth and development of democratic regimes across the globe has been of 
particular interest to political scientists over the last several decades.  The question of 
what is an appropriate and relevant regime depends on various aspects of people’s 
political ideals.  Mozambique is one such nation wherein democratic developments have 
been recent and somewhat successful.  However, like many African countries, economic 
underdevelopment has isolated pockets of the country’s citizens in rural areas. 
Considering that a vast majority of Mozambique’s citizens live in rural areas, 
understanding their opinions and political ideals concerning how they should be governed 
is essential in developing and maintaining a legitimate democratic regime.  Historically, 
Mozambicans have been governed by a variety of means including authoritarian, 
traditional, colonial and communist regimes.  Their history and experience have shaped 
their political ideals and views today.   
This thesis focuses firstly on the views and political ideals of rural dwellers, and 
secondly on generational differences in political ideals and views on regime legitimacy.  
Many factors influence people’s political ideals.  The formation of those political ideals is 
not the primary focus of this thesis – what those political ideals are, however, is the 
focus.  Research suggests youth and the elders have different views concerning how they 
should be ruled and what constitutes a legitimate political authority and legitimate regime 
at the local level.  Older members of Mozambican society have lived through civil war 
and poverty and deprivation while today’s youth have lived in peace and the beginnings 
of steady economic growth.  If these two significant segments of Mozambican society 
hold strongly opposing views concerning what constitutes a legitimate regime, this would 





B. SUMMARY OF CURRENT LITERATURE 
1. Survey of Prior Work on the Question 
Volumes of literature have been written on democratization in Africa.  This is 
arguably the most pressing issue on the continent today.1  Nevertheless, democratic 
reforms have been “tentative, partial, and incomplete, leaving Africa with hybrid regimes 
that awkwardly mix old and new principles of organization.”2  These hybrid systems mix 
the “old” and “new” principles of organization because Africans are still trying to 
reconcile traditional government methods with imported forms of democracy.  
Democratic development endeavors are often overshadowed by debates concerning the 
type of democracy Africans are adopting.  However, the more important question may be 
whether or not the resulting hybrid regimes are truly legitimate in the eyes of the people 
throughout all levels of society.   
In this thesis, a regime or regime type refers to how the government is organized 
and hence how the people are ruled.  Regime types include liberal democratic types, 
communist types and military and civilian dictatorships.  Two common regime types in 
Africa are, for example, the hegemonial exchange type and the bureaucratic centralist 
type.3  The strength of the system lies in the acceptance of the legitimacy of the regime 
associated with the state.  As Chabal notes, having accountable, legitimate leaders is even 
more important to Africans than going through the motions of multi-party democracy.4  It 
is through the rules of the regime that these “accountable, legitimate leaders” are 
selected. 
The concept of regime is often confused with the concepts of state and 
government, yet the terms are distinctly different in the context of this thesis and political 
                                                 
1 In The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa,  Mbaku and Ihonvbere argue that the 
“reconstruction of the African state to provide citizens with participatory, accountable, and transparent 
governance structures remains one of the most important issues in the continent’s political adjustment in 
the “new” global era” (5).   
2 Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market 
Reform in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 14. 
3 Rothschild and Chazan explain in-depth the attributes of these types of regimes in Donald Rothchild 
and Naomi Chazan, ed., The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1988) 248-252. 
4 Patrick Chabal, “A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa,” International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 74 (April 1998) 302. 
3 
science literature in general.  There is consensus in literature that the term “state” refers 
to “the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance.”5  The 
state is the most general term used to reference the organizations through which power is 
exercised.  The primary components of the state are the “decision-making structures 
(executives, parties, parliaments), decision-enforcing institutions (bureaucracies, 
parastatal organizations, and security forces), and decision-mediating bodies (primarily 
courts, tribunals, and investigatory commissions).”6  The state takes on different 
characteristics depending on the country in which it is organized.  It often is used to 
reference the organization of instruments of domination.  A regime, which was defined in 
the previous paragraph, is a less general concept than the state.  The regime, in contrast to 
the state, is used to define the forms and procedures of rule.   “If the idea of state is 
associated primarily with the organization of power, regime focuses on how state power 
is exercised and legitimated.”7  At the lowest level of generality, below the state and the 
regime, is the government.  The government is the composed of the individuals who 
govern administratively.  This thesis is not concerned with the legitimacy of the 
Mozambican state, but with a specific form of rule – the democratic regime type – and its 
institutional components. 
Some scholars argue that, at independence, African countries adopted 
constitutions that held legal sway but lacked legitimacy.8  “Constitution making was a 
top-down, elite-driven and non-participatory process in which the rules were designed 
externally and imposed on the people.”9  The adopted regimes “did not reflect the values 
of the people, nor their cultures and traditions.”10  Constitutions were based on European 
models that developed in the course of European history, and thus reflected European 
                                                 
5 Raymond Duvall and John R. Freeman, “The State and Dependent Capitalism,” International Studies 
Quarterly 25, 1 (1981) 106. 
6 Naomi Chazan, et. al. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa  3rd Ed  (Boulder: Lynned Rienner 
Publishers, 1999) 39. 
7 Chazan, et. al. 39. 
8 Mbaku in John Mukum Mbaku and Julius O. Ihonvbere ed., The Transition to Democratic 
Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2003) 110.   See also U. 
Sundhaussen.  “Democracy and the middle classes: reflections on political development” The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 37 (1991) 100-117. 
9 Mbaku 110. 
10 Mbaku 110. 
4 
conceptions of legitimacy.  The process was led by elites in the urban areas, neglecting 
the input of the large population that lived in rural areas.  “The primary issue was that 
these models did not reflect the values of the people to be governed by the rules;” thus 
they lacked legitimacy.11  Ultimately, lawmakers failed to “engage the population in the 
type of constitution making that would have provided each country with relevant and 
effective laws and institutions.”12  The regime types instituted by the constitutions were 
comprised of procedures and forms of rule that, if practiced as the constitutions stated, 
were foreign to the majority of the population.   
In the 1990s, “constitutional engineering enjoyed quite a revival,” with the 
wisdom of the time suggesting that constitutional documents “should conform to certain 
generally agreed upon principles of democratic governance in their various forms, while 
at the same time they should reflect national traditions and mores.”13  In many African 
countries, including Mozambique, national commissions or conferences were held in 
which the constitutions were redrafted, representing a broader base among the population 
than the original constitutions.  While this process served to re-legitimize the states and 
their authority, major sectors of society, most notably rural populations, were left out of 
the process.   This insight is important, because, as Ndulo argues, the “process of 
adopting a constitution is as important as its substance.  The process must be legitimate 
and in order for it to be legitimate it must be inclusive.  It should represent the interests of 
all the people in the country.”14  As a result of the exclusion of the rural population, the 
regime types that resulted from the new constitutions did not fully incorporate the ideals 
                                                 
11 Mbaku 110. 
12 Ibid 111. 
13 Jorge Heine in Ursula J. van Beek, ed.  Democracy under constructions: Patterns from four 
continents (Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2006) 75. 
14 Muno Ndulo, Constitution Making in Africa (Cornell University, Africa Notes, December 1996) 4. 
http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/AFRICA/outreach/pdf/Constitution_Making_in_Africa.pdf#search=%22Co
nstitutions%20of%20Africa%22  Accessed 16 September 2006  
5 
of the rural population, particularly the role of traditional institutions in the regime.15  As 
the regimes of African states further consolidate, this is an issue that they have begun to 
address. 
For centuries, the dominant regime types in Africa have belonged to a family of 
regimes that were labeled “traditional” or “tribal,” meaning that they were informal16 
systems, often hereditary and gerontocratic in nature.  In some areas these traditional 
systems of rule encompassed hierarchical kingdoms, but in most places they were 
composed of a series of decentralized, loosely-associated local rulers, often called 
“kings” or “chiefs.”17  The colonial interlude created larger political units encompassing 
many precolonial societies.  Despite attempts by the government to gradually 
“emasculate [local] rulers of all powers, leaving them with only their ceremonial 
functions,”18 local kings and chiefs have persisted in many societies.  The result was that 
two systems of rule, democratic and traditional, coexisted after independence.  However, 
in most states the initial democratic regimes established after independence were short-
lived in practice.  At the local level traditional regimes persisted while, at the national 
level, the democratic regimes quickly evolved into authoritarian dictatorships for a 
variety of reasons.  In the last fifteen years, through internal and international pressure, 
African states have slowly begun the process of re-democratization.  In many rural areas, 
however, traditional regimes have persisted.  These two regimes types co-exist within 
states, often based on different foundations of legitimacy. 
In fact, Forrest suggests that in the post-colonial era there has been “a broad effort 
to reprioritize an indigenous African sense of legitimacy in regard to local and regional 
                                                 
15 Ndulo addresses this point in regards to constitutions and traditional authority in his essay entitled 
Constitution Making in Africa:  “There is a need to accommodate traditional leaders in constitutional 
arrangements or, at least,, face up to their existence.  For instance, traditional leaders could be iincorporated 
into the local government system and form the nucleus of that system.  This could enhance the 
effectiveness of local government in the rural areas.  If colonial powers were shred enough to use them in 
administering the colonial state, why should the modern African political systems not be able to involve the 
traditional systems in efforts to reach out to small communities and build national consensus and 
cohesion.” 3. 
16 “Informal” in this context and throughout the thesis is defined as “not codified in written law.”   
17 Chazan, et. al. 81-82. 
18 Austin Amissah in Dov Ronen, ed., Democracy and Pluralism in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1986) 44. 
6 
authority.”19 In some instances, without a specific government mandate, the chieftancy 
institutions have continued to exist, serving functions such as mediation and land 
allocation “that formal local government is not carrying out because it lacks the 
resources, capacity or understanding.”20  In many areas, particularly in rural regions, 
traditional leaders continue to effectively serve in social, political and religious leadership 
capacities.  This reflects the view that chieftancy is a dynamic, adaptable institution that 
maintains relevancy today.21   
The role of government in rural areas, where traditional and democratic regimes 
exist in duality, is crucial to overall state legitimacy.  It is well known that historically the 
formal “states” in Africa often have had limited reach beyond the urbanized areas.  The 
authority of the formal regimes – whether democratic or authoritarian - often competes 
with other legitimate authorities, such as traditional rulers.  In many rural areas, for 
example, traditional authorities have more legitimacy and can exercise greater local 
control than the central government, regardless of national level regime type.22  This is a 
result of a variety of historical, economic and political factors. Economic and political 
control was focused in urban areas, in a sense forcing the rural areas to fend for 
themselves.23  The lack of state penetration into rural areas has placed greater importance 
on the role of traditional authorities, who were for many decades the only visible form of 
a political structure.24  Understanding the role traditional authorities play in rural areas as 
well as the acceptance of the traditional regime is one of the primary endeavors of this 
thesis.  
While it is generally accepted that traditional regimes, as manifested through the 
authority of traditional leaders, is a legitimate regime in many rural areas, advances in 
                                                 
19 Joshua B. Forrest, Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances and Politics (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2004) 236. 
20 Donald I Ray in Donald R. Ray and P.S Reddy ed., Grassroots Governance? Chiefs in Africa and 
the Afro-Caribbean (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003) 18. 
21 See George B. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992). 
22 See Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 177.   
23 Francis M. Deng et al.,  Sovereignty as Responsibility (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1996) 105. 
24 See Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).  
He claims the state cannot penetrate rural areas because rural areas strongholds of traditional authority.   
7 
education, development and technology25 have exposed rural-dwellers to other regime-
types that are not consistent with the form of rule and systems within the traditional 
regimes.  These developments in African society have undermined the foundations of the 
gerontocratic system in the eyes of young people.26  Among young people, the most 
mobile group in society, ideas about authority and political organization are learned in 
school and in the cities, areas that older people have less access to, or are less inclined to 
go.  Youth are more “receptive to the spread of western values, conveyed by the school 
system, the administration and the media.”27  It is not surprising that a significant gap 
seems to have developed in the perceptions and opinions about legitimate regimes 
between generations. 
This thesis deals with conceptions of legitimate forms of rule – regime types - in 
rural areas among members of different generations.  Many African countries are 
undergoing rapid social change, which means that younger generations often have 
significantly different life experiences from those of their elders.  In Liberia, for example, 
the views and attitudes of the generation that came of age during Liberia’s civil war in the 
1990s differ significantly from those of the older generation that had already come of age 
during the war.28  While examining the effects of war on the political views of legitimacy 
of youth is not the primary focus of this thesis, it is important to note that often the views 
of youth diverge from those in political leadership.  War plays a role in this divergence of 
views.  In some cases, an underlying cause of war is the incompatibility of political ideals 
between generations.  In others, post-war social order and political organization may 
provide the environment for differing political ideals between generations to manifest 
themselves.  
Independent of the circumstances, two notable aspects of youth attitudes are their 
lower level of respect for elders and greater acceptance of individualism.29  Older 
                                                 
25 Factors such as greater access to urban centers, increases in civic education and, perhaps the greatest 
factor, access to information via the radio have contributed to greater exposure of the rural population to 
different types of authority (i.e. the president, the governor, parliamentarians, etc).  While some of these 
advances are limited, they are never the less influential.   
26 Codou Bop, “African youth makes a takeover bid,” The Unesco Courier 52, 1 (Jan 1999) 32. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy (New York: New York University Press, 1999). 
29 Ibid 285. 
8 
members of society tend to place a greater value the role of traditional leaders in the 
decision-making processes of government, particularly at the local level.  Historically and 
culturally, age has been greatly respected and is sign of authority.  For decades, youth 
have been more vocal and active in rejecting the authority of elders, a trend that continues 
across the continent.30 
Urban youth organizations played a prominent role in African independence 
movements, and indeed, across the globe, youth “have been instrumental in the socio-
economic and political reconstitution of their societies.”31  They also played a role in 
influencing popular political attitudes.32  As the role of youth in politics increased in the 
1950s and 1960s, their ideals began to have influence within the existing authority 
structures.  Bayart suggests that their “acceptance onto the colonial scene led to conflicts 
between elders and minors.”33   To the young revolutionaries, “traditional authorities 
were seemingly the very antithesis of the modern revolution that they sought to lead.”34  
As the first wave of independence youth became leaders in their countries, the regimes 
that took hold were centralized, authoritarian regimes.  A duality between the centralized 
regimes and the local traditional regimes persisted.  During the decades under which 
many African countries were under authoritarian regimes, political and administrative 
leaders were unwilling to devolve and decentralize state authority.35 As Africa moves 
                                                 
30 The proliferation of youth movements and parties from the immediate pre-independence era to the 
present is evidence of this trend.  For example, the primary goals of the Somali Youth League in the 1940’s 
were to “unite all Somalis generally, and the youth expecially with the consequent repudiation of all 
harmful old prejudices (such, for example, as tribal and clan distinction); to educate the youth in modern 
civilization by means of schools and by cultural propaganda circles.”  See I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of 
the Somali (Oxford: James Currey, 2002) 124.  A more general yet contemporary example of this trend are 
the youth organizations formed around student movements.  “In many local communities small youth 
associations – often the successors of traditional constructs – have resurfaced in recent years.  Some youth 
groups are attached to church groups and Muslim communities.  Separate youth organizations have also 
been established to cater to the interests of elite youth in the cities (the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides are 
major examples).  These associations, much like their students counterparts, represent certain interests and 
worldviews and help to define the individual member’s social positions and standing.”  Naomi Chazan, et. 
al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 96. 
31 Zola Knowledge Saphetha, “Young Intellectuals in Action: Youth as Torch-bearers of the Future,”  
Ingede Journal of African Scholarship 1, 2 (Dec 2004) 3.   
32 Claude E. Welch Jr., “Obstacles to ‘Peasant War’ in Africa,” African Studies Review 20,3 
(December 1977) 129. 
33 Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: the politics of the belly (London: Longman Publishers, 
1996) 113. 
34 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 174. 
35 Olowu and Wunsch 57. 
9 
beyond the immediate post-independence era and begins once again to attempt to 
liberalize regimes, the dynamic between youth and older members of society continues to 
evolve.  As previously noted, rural areas are becoming more aware and involved in the 
activities of the state.36 
Most studies of youth culture in Africa focus on youth roles in conflict and 
revolutions, while focusing less on their role in political activity.37  Youth activity in 
contemporary politics is understudied, yet nevertheless extremely important.  In societies 
where authority is associated with age, youth strive to gain status through alternative 
means such as accumulation of wealth or education.  Ellis argues that the social 
marginalization of youth was a key element in Liberia’s civil war, illustrating the lengths 
to which youth will go to gain status due to their age.38  In other cases, the younger 
generation have had greater educational and economic opportunities, and now have 
access to more resources than their parents.39  “Consequently, this has transformed power 
relations in the family in favour of the youth and against the elders, who hitherto relied 
on their control of land for the power they wielded over their children.”40  The crisis of 
legitimacy is exacerbated in rural areas, where land is valuable resource and tradition is 
still entrenched in society. 
Bratton, et. al.’s Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform finds that most 
Africans living in democracies do not wish to return to a traditional system of 
governance.  However, it also finds opposition to traditional rulers is weakest in rural 
areas, suggesting a divergence between rural and urban understandings legitimate rule.  
(Bratton et al also considered the potential impact of age on political opinions, but their 
findings on this question were inconclusive.)  This study includes only the most 
successful democracies in Africa.  My study of Mozambique will address similar 
questions in the context of a regime that is still in transition to democracy. 
                                                 
36 “More” is a distinctly relative term.  They are able to be more involved due to greater access to 
media and urban centers than in the past.  Their involvement and access is still, however, very small 
compared to more developed states. 
37 See Afua Twum-Danso in Angela McIntyre, ed., Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in 
Africa (ISS publication, April 2004) 7-30.   
38 Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy (New York: New York University Press, 2001) 289. 
39 Afua Twum-Danso in Angela McIntyre, Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa. 18. 
40 Ibid. 
10 
2. Major Debates 
It is unclear as to what comprises a legitimate regime in the African context.  
Some academics argue that traditional structures of governance that have endured to the 
present in some derivation of their original form are legitimate and must be incorporated 
into formal structures of the regime.41  Charles Crothers argues that while traditional 
authority may seem anachronistic, their value and legitimacy as political leaders should 
be taken seriously.42  Mamdani argues, however, that what has remained of endogenous 
forms of government is a corruption of the original form of chieftancy, because colonial 
rulers exploited and modified this “traditional” form of government to suit their strategies 
of indirect rule or divide and rule.43   Colonial governments undermined the traditional 
institutions, destroying the philosophical bases of duties and obligations “regulating the 
relationship between the governing and the governed.”44  Therefore, the chieftaincies that 
exist today bear little resemblance to the authentic and “indigenous” institutions that their 
proponents attribute to them.  While Mamdani may be correct in claiming that traditional 
authority structures have been corrupted and should no longer be considered legitimate,45 
they have nevertheless persisted in many societies.   
Von Trotha suggests that as states struggle to develop legitimate process and 
procedures – the essence of the regime - “the institution of chieftaincy could play a 
leading role, becoming the center of new political orders drawing on the experiences and 
the political, cultural and social resources of both precolonial and administrative 
                                                 
41 Daniel T. Osabu-Kle, in Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa, 
argues similarly that emerging democracies must incorporate cultural constructs of government to be 
effective.  Political practices must be compatible with indigenous culture, not foreign imports of Western 
democratic practice that are alien to traditional culture.   
42 See Charles Crothers, “Social Characteristics of Traditional Leaders and Public Views on their 
Political Roles” in Donald R. Ray and P.S. Reddy, ed., Grassroots Governance? Chiefs in Africa and the 
Afro-Caribbean (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2003) 69-82. 
43 See C. Keulder “Traditional leaders and rural development” in d’Engelbronner-Kolff , Hinz and 
Sindano ed., Traditional Authority and Democracy in Southern Africa (South Africa: New Namibia Books, 
1998) 289-322.   See also Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, where he shows that the institutions 
of chieftancy have changed dramatically since Ghanaian independence.   
44 John A. A. Ayoade, “The African Search for Democracy,” in Dov Ronen, ed. Democracy and 
Pluralism in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986) 25. 
45 This is one of the primary arguments in Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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chieftancy.”46 He argues that chiefs “defend local culture and social order as well as 
being ‘at the center of local political life.’”47  In support of Von Trotha’s argument, 
Forrest asserts that a “re-Africanization” of political authority is taking place across the 
continent.  Decaying state-society linkages have caused an increasing turn toward the 
formalization of traditional political linkages, particularly in rural areas.48  Once state 
building began in Botswana, for example, the value of chiefs was immediately 
recognized and codified in the Chieftanship Act of 1956.  After independence in 1966, 
traditional leaders were incorporated into the formal regime.  While it was clear that their 
status, authority and jurisdiction decreased in comparison to the pre-colonial era, the 
significance of their role as legitimate authorities was formalized.  The Botswana case 
study is just one of several wherein traditional authority continues to play a formal 
political role.49   
The view that traditional authority should not be formally incorporated into the 
system has its supporters as well.  Traditional leaders are sometimes appointed or 
selected to take their position without “mechanisms of accountability, let alone 
mechanisms to encourage good performance.”50  For those who propose that Africa’s 
regimes should continue to move toward adopting liberal democratic ideals in practice, 
the issue of the legitimacy of these traditional rulers is pivotal.  According to Joseph 
Egwurube’s pioneering work on traditional governance in Nigeria, a dilemma is faced if 
traditional authority institutions are incorporated into the regime.  “By definition, 
traditional rulerships are closed systems, characterized by stratification, heredity, 
legitimacy and personalism.  These features are untenable in open, modern, local 
                                                 
46 Trutz von Trotha, “From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy: Some Problems and Prospects of 
African Chieftancy” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 37-38 (1996) 91.   
47 Ibid. 
48 Forrest 246. 
49 Peirre du Toit touches on issues of traditional leadership in his case studies of state-building in 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa.  See State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa 
(Washington, DC: UNIP, 1995). 
50 Charles Crothers in Donald R. Ray and P.S Reddy ed., Grassroots Governance? Chiefs in Africa 
and the Afro-Caribbean (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003) 70. 
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government systems involving local initiative, universalism, equality and change.”51  In 
many African states, the government can exploit and manipulate traditional leaders, 
interfering with their succession and appointment processes, calling into question claims 
of legitimacy.  In Uganda, for example, local government based on the leadership of 
chiefs has come to symbolize an abusive state.52  In many African states, however, 
traditional regimes are present more in rural areas than urban.  Von Trotha maintains that 
strong urban-rural linkages in Africa require that regime reforms, most notably 
democratic regime reforms, be founded in rural reforms, particularly in regards to 
traditional political structures. Mamdani agrees that democratization requires rural 
reforms, but disagrees fundamentally about the nature of the required reforms.  Any 
reforms in the form of rule, in Mamdani’s view, need to consider that traditional rulers 
are “decentralized despots,” and thus a primary obstacle to democratization and reform in 
rural Africa. In support of Mamdani’s argument, van Kessel and Oomen maintain that the 
“institution of chieftanship is not in accord with the precepts of democracy in its late 
twentieth century form.”53  If these institutions do not coincide with the political ideals of 
the rural population, their legitimacy and ability to be integrated into the democratically 
developing regimes is in question.  Ultimately, those opposed to recognizing the role of 
traditional rulers claim that doing so will undermine democratic progress.  They argue 
that African societies must shift away from the chiefly order and embrace modern forms 
of rule.54 
The final issue this thesis seeks to address concerns intergenerational variations in 
rural beliefs about legitimate authority.  The role of youth in contemporary Africa has 
been studied from a number of different perspectives. Gable argues that Manjaco youth in                                                  
51 Joseph Egwurube, “Traditional Rulers and Modern Local Government in Nigeria” in L. 
Adamolekun, D. Olowu, and M. Laleye, ed., Local Government in West Africa Since Independence (Lagos: 
Lagos University Press, 1988) 170. 
52 James S. Wunsch and Dan Ottemoeller in Dele Olowu and James S. Wunsch ed., Local Governance 
in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralization (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004) 193. 
53 Ineke van Kessel and Barbara Oomen, “‘One Chief, One Vote’: The Revival of Traditional 
Authorities in Post-Apartheid South Africa” African Affairs 96, 385 (Oct 1997) 573.  See also page 51 of 
V. G. Simiyu in Walter O. Oyugi, ed., Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa (Nairobi: Heinemann, 
1988) where he argues that Africa has diverse traditions of governance, some which incorporate elements 
of democracy and some that do not.  In general, however, none are comparable to modern notions of true 
democracy.   
54 Basil Davidson is a strong proponent of this view.  See Which Way Africa? The Search for a New 
Society 3rd Ed (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971) 99.   
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Guinea-Bissau, as the most educated members of their communities, they seek to act as 
moral agents with no intention of encouraging revolution.55  Nolte argues that, in the case 
of Nigerian politics, Yoruba youth have stronger ties to the government than their elders 
and have effectively weakened local Yoruba local elites and traditional rulers.  
Accordingly, their role in rural society is much more influential than the elders who 
traditionally held power within the community.56  If Africa’s young governments are 
seeking to establish relevant, functioning institutions that will maintain legitimacy for 
generations to come, the political ideals of youth, Africa’s future, must be considered.  
Unfortunately, youth are often “neglected and overlooked by both scholarly and policy-
oriented writings,”57 a gap which this thesis attempts to narrow. 
These debates raise important issues, but no compelling evidence is offered in 
support of arguments about the nature of political legitimacy in Africa.  In many cases, 
no empirical evidence is expressed regarding how rural Africans view the legitimacy of 
the regimes that impact them.  By extension, no studies discuss how rural perceptions of 
the legitimacy of alternative regimes and the institutions that make up those regimes 
might vary. This thesis represents an initial attempt to fill this gap by investigating what 
rural people actually say about political legitimacy in Mozambique.  As Mamdani 
suggests, enfranchising and engaging citizens in rural areas is essential to 
democratization.  However, understanding their attitudes about traditional regimes and 
democratic regimes be understood rather than assumed.  As Jocelyn Alexander notes, 
“political practices in the rural areas where the majority of southern Africa’s people live 
receive short shrift, while democratic aspirations are assumed rather than investigated.”58  
While this thesis will by no means be comprehensive in engaging all sectors of rural 
society, it will provide insight into the attitudes and perceptions of the Mozambicans 
                                                 
55 Eric Gable, “The Culture Development Club: Youth, Neo-Tradition, and the Construction of 
Society in Guinea-Bissau” Anthropological Quarterly 73,4 (October 2000) 195-203. 
56 Insa Nolte, “Identity and violence: the politics of youth in Ijebu-Remo, Nigeria” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 42, 1 (2004) 84. 
57 Afua Twum-Danso in Angela McIntyre, Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa (ISS 
Publication, April 2004).  
58 Jocelyn Alexander, “The Local State in Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice and Ideas About 
Authority” Africa 67, 1 (1997) 1. 
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living in a particular rural area – one that has likely not been engaged in such formal 
discussion before.   
 
C. DEFINING LEGITIMACY 
1. Definition 
The issue of gaining and maintaining political legitimacy in Africa’s states has 
been problematic.59  While at times the consolidation of legitimate regimes on the 
continent has seemed like an impossible task, it is nevertheless a necessary and 
worthwhile endeavor.  Weber found that stability and the effectiveness of authority is 
directly influenced by society’s perceptions of its legitimacy.  In order for authority to 
maintain social order and cohesion, it must maintain legitimacy.60  According to 
Hayward, 
the nature of the relationship between those who lead and the people as a 
whole depends, in large part, on the notions of legitimacy which prevail in 
society, and these will determine the success of government in the long 
run.  Citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy shape expectations about the 
leaders and their anticipated policies, and also set standards for the 
validation or justification of a particular regime, including who has power, 
how it is attained, and who benefits.  When the distance between these 
standards and the perceived reality becomes too great, citizens may 
withdraw the mantel of legitimacy from their government.61   
 
Prospects for improving governance “depend on properly diagnosing and 
addressing public grievances,” a process that will be most effective if the views and 
                                                 
59 Fred M. Hayward and Ahmed R. Dumbuya offer evidence on different means by which several of 
Africa’s leaders have tried to gain and maintain legitimacy in the post-independent era with various degrees 
of success, see “Political Legitimacy, Political Symbols, and National Leadership in West Africa,” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 21, 4 (Dec 1983).  See also Paul R. Dettman, “Leaders and Structures in 
‘Third World’ Politics: Contrasting Approaches to Legitimacy,” Comparative Politics 6, 2 (Jan 1974).  
Both articles discuss the difficulties leaders encounter when they try to legitimize their rule when they are 
not consistent with the value patterns of society or, in contrast, the success the leaders have when their 
attempts are consistent with societal value patterns.   
60 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: Univeristy of 
California Press, 1978). 
61 Hayward and Dumbuya 650. 
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political ideals of society are clearly understood.62  In other words, states can govern 
more easily and effectively if the basis on which they legitimate their use of force aligns 
with the concept of legitimate rule held by their citizens.  It is in this instance that 
properly measuring the public’s legitimacy orientation is most necessary, and this 
requires a strict definition of the concept itself.  While many scholars have studied 
legitimacy, there is no universally accepted definition. It is one of “the oldest problems in 
the history of social thought.”63  For the purposes of this thesis, legitimacy is measured 
substantively.64  Substantive legitimacy is based on the views of the citizenry, or acted 
upon by the leadership, “in terms of the dominant political ideals and beliefs in the 
political system.”65  Legitimacy can be measured on four basic levels – international, 
national, societal/group or individual.66  Because the research for this thesis focused on 
interviews with individuals, the definition will be framed in the context of individual 
perceptions of legitimacy.67   Societal groups will be based on age.  Because the general 
concept of legitimacy is uniform across these levels, the same indices can be used to 
measure it.  Peter G. Stillman definition is the most relevant and valuable one for the 
purposes of this thesis: “a government is legitimate if and only if the results of the 
governmental output are compatible with the value patterns of society.”68  Some 
elaboration is in order. 
                                                 
62 M. Stephen Weatherford, “Measuring Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 86, 
1 (March 1992) 149.  Richard M. Merelman also explains how and why legitimate regimes are more 
efficient than illegitimate regimes in “Learning and Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review 
60, 3 (Sep 1966) 548-549. 
63 Morris Zelditch, “Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions,” Social 
Psychology Quarterly 64, 1 (2001) 4. 
64 Three major focuses of legitimacy as described by Hayward and Dumbuya are personal, procedural 
and substantive.  650. 
65 Hayward and Dumbuya 650. 
66 See Peter G. Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy,” Polity 7,1 (Autumn 1974) 32-56.  He expands 
upon the four levels in “The Concept of Legitimacy.”  For reasons of relevance I did not expand upon each 
of them individually. 
67 Carl J. Friedrich in Man and His Government (New York: Graw-Hill, 1963) outlines this approach 
wherein there a various levels and one must decide how legitimacy will be evaluated for each respective 
level.  As Peter Stillman notes in “The Concept of Legitimacy,” Polity 7, 1 (Autumn 1974), this approach is 
similar to Lipset’s approach in defining legitimacy in Political Man (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 
1963).  
68 Peter Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy,” Polity 7, 1 (Autumn 1974) 39. 
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First, government actions affect individuals in society, be they the passing of a 
law, an act of war, extraction of resources, as does government inaction.  Secondly, most 
definitions assume that a fundamental condition for legitimacy is consensus.69  The term 
“consensus,” however, implies that everyone has agreed or conceded to a directive or 
desired course of action.  In contrast to the term consensus, Stillman’s definition uses the 
term compatible.  Compatibility implies that actions of the government are compatible 
with the political ideals of the individuals in question.  One government action that is not 
compatible with an individual’s views will not delegitimize it; successive and perpetual 
government actions that are not compatible with the political ideals of that individual will 
begin to erode legitimacy.  Finally, a “value pattern” is the specification, ranking, and 
ordering of that which the individual “esteems and seeks, in a world of scarcity where 
there are limits and costs to what can be esteemed, sought, and obtained.”70  These value 
patterns, or political ideals, are based on individual notions of how authority is 
legitimately bestowed and executed.  Thus, a legitimate regime is a system of rule whose 
institutional forms and structures are compatible with the political ideals of individuals.   
2. Legitimacy in the Mozambican Context 
The question of legitimacy in Mozambique is extremely relevant as the 
government continues to adopt democratic procedures. In the pre-colonial era, local 
chiefs ruled in cooperation with village elders.  Their role in the post-colonial age 
beginning in 1974, however, has been through several transitions, including a period of 
marginalization and exclusion during the communist period in the 1970s and 80s, to the 
present, in which there has been a resurgence of traditional institution’s inclusion in the 
government. The institution of chieftancy in Mozambique, as in many other parts of 
Africa, “has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of dramatic social 
transformation.”71  The authority of chiefs and their ability to act decisively on behalf of 
the rural population stem largely from the fact that liberal democracy has yet to produce 
governments on the continent that penetrate rural areas effectively.72  In the absence of 
                                                 
69 Zelditch 9. 
70 Stillman 40. 
71 Jude Fokwang, “Tribal Innovators?  Traditional Leadership and Development in Africa.” 
CODESRIA Bulletin, No 3 and 4 (2005) 43. 
72 Ibid. 
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other governing institutions, traditional authority persists as the only regime type that 
affects the lives of the people.  During the nearly thirty-year long Mozambican civil war, 




The primary research for this project takes the form of focus groups and 
individual interviews in rural Nampula Province.  The goal of this project is to discern the 
political ideals of different generations in order to assess whether they converge on a 
common perception what constitutes a legitimate regime or whether they differ.  Using 
within case comparison in a single region – Nampula Province – nine focus groups and 
one individual interview were conducted.  Except for one focus group near Monapo 
district in which one female youth was present in a group with five other young men, 
focus groups were not mixed gender. The groups were organized according to age, with 
older adults defined as those around forty years of age or older.  Youth are those between 
fifteen and thirty years of age, and adults are those over the age of 30.  Individuals were 
assigned to the groups based on self-identification of their ages, which yielded reliable 
groups because in Mozambican society, individuals often self-identify as youth within the 
cultural norm.  The term “youth” is not attached to any specific age group, though those 
identifying themselves as youth were rarely over 28 years of age.  It is important to note 
that female youth and female “old” women were on average younger than the males that 
were self-identified under the same categories.  For example, in Niapala, the “old” 
women were aged 35-40 and the “old” men were 40-46 years of age.  In many cases the 
older women did not know their age and were estimating.  The men always knew their 
exact age.  Thus, while the age spreads based on gender are not consistent, the concepts 
of youth and older adult are still preserved.  Table One shows the composition and 





Table 1. Focus groups (The * indicates the focus group that was not used for data purposes 
because, one, the age spread was to broad and, second, the cabo73 was not present 
with the group but remained within earshot, causing the participants to be 
uncomfortable and not offer completely honest opinions.) 
 
Other evidence is based on the primary research conducted and published in law 
student theses from the Law Faculty of the Catholic University in Nampula.  The author 
also had first hand experience and informal interviews with individuals who have worked 
in the fields of anthropology, development, linguistics and church-related leadership 
development in Nampula Province and the rural north for many years.   
The questionnaire (See Appendix A) used in the focus groups was divided into 
four sections.  The first section, questions one through three, asked direct questions about 
individual history and background.  The independent variable – age – was identified in 
Question One.  Questions four through seven focused on government performance and 
opinions on its role and effectiveness, leading participants to express the priorities they 
thought the government should address.  Their responses to questions four through eight 
elicited their ideals – the intervening variable.  Question nine, the culturally relevant 
scenarios, narrowed the focus to what the individuals not only perceived to be the most 
effective form of authority, but also the most relevant and legitimate – those that 
coincided with their political ideals.  Finally, questions ten through twelve explicitly 
                                                 
73 For definition of term, see Appendix B. 
Location Gender Ages # in Group 
Niapala female 35-40 4 
Barragem female 15-21 5 
ADA School female 24-29 4 
Barragem female 40-65 5 
Niapala male 40-46 3 
Rapale Cabo (int.) male 42 1 
Near Rapale male 27-49* 7 
Near Rapale male 42-63 3 
Near Monapo  male, 1 F 20-29 6 
Near Monapo male 18-28 6 
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address the role of traditional authorities and their relevance to the individual in a 
political sense.   Responses to Questions Nine through Twelve caused respondents to 
express the degree of compatibility of ideals with the traditional regimes that exist at the 
local level and how they could be reformed to make them more compatible with their 
ideals, and thus more legitimate. 
2. Terminology 
Terms used to describe individual positions of authority and methods of selecting 
those authorities vary from community to community.  While the government has defined 
the role of both appointed government officials and traditional authorities, in rural 
communities, terms used to describe those authorities are not uniform.  For example, the 
term “leader” in English is translated into “lídere” in Portuguese.  In the area near Rapale 
where some interviews were conducted, when translated into Mahkuwa (the local 
language) the term “lídere” only refers to traditional authority structures, not any other 
type of leader.   
Methods of selection for leaders also have different meanings in the Makhuwa 
context than the direct translation of the terms.  For example, in English the term 
“elected” refers to someone who has been voted into office.  In Portuguese, this word is 
“eleito.”  When translated into Makhuwa, however, “eleito” only refers authorities who 
have been consensually selected by the appropriate body as, for example, when the 
family of the chief consensually selects his successor from within the immediate family.  
Thus, research interviews had to be carefully worded to avoid confusion based on the 
principles.  A question such as “Are leaders elected in your community?” would be 
tautological because the answer would be yes by definition – traditional authorities are 
selected consensually.  To evoke the meaning of the English word “elected,” the correct 
word to use would be the Portuguese “votado.”  The information in these pages has been 
written to reflect the English definitions of words.  For example, if an individual said 
“votado” in an interview, it will be written as “elected” in this thesis.  In relevant cases 
where an individual said “eleito,” it will be written as “consensually selected.” 
Defining the role and position of political authorities is also important.  In many 
cases, leaders may hold specific positions but be selected differently based on the 
community.  Secretaries, official representatives of the government in an area, are usually 
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appointed but in some cases elected by the people.  Régulos and cabos are community 
leaders that have achieved their position through a traditional means of consensual 
selection based on the decision of their family.  In most rural communities, the method of 
selecting the person for this position is the same.  For further elaboration on government 
and traditional positions of authority and their respective roles in society, see Appendix 
B.  It should also be noted that Parliament passed decree 15/2000 on 15 June 2000, which 
declared traditional authorities official members and representatives of the government, 
thereby theoretically incorporating them into the system that includes secretaries.  
However, to avoid confusion, this thesis will refer to secretaries and those appointed by 
the government as “the government” and régulos and their associated positions as 
“traditional authorities”.  Technically speaking, the state is comprised of both these 














II. MOZAMBIQUE IN CONTEXT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The manner in which the current political system has developed has shaped how 
the population of rural areas understands the workings of their government.  Colonialism, 
independence, civil war, and the continuing efforts to establish a peaceful, functional 
democracy have all contributed to Mozambique’s current condition.  This chapter lays 
the historical foundation needed to understand the current state of affairs.  Rural 
Mozambique is in a state of political transition.  The government has slowly been taking 
steps to increase its power in non-urban areas.  These actions have manifested themselves 
in various new laws and decrees, which, while they give the appearance of change on 
paper, are often not put into practice.  Traditional authority institutions continue to persist 
and meet the needs of some people where the government falls short.  A formalized dual 
political system has thus emerged in which traditional authority institutions and official 
government structures often co-exist by mandate from the government.  The specific 
roles of traditional authorities are defined on paper, but in rural areas where individuals 
may never even hear of laws the parliament has passed, their official roles are not clearly 
understood.  Even in areas where roles are defined, the dual system allows individuals to 
essentially “pick” who they want to be their authority.  This situation provides a unique 
circumstance in which the question of legitimate authority can be studied.   
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Figure 1.   Map of Mozambique 
 
B. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
1. Pre-colonial Mozambican Political Structure 
Understanding the development of political structures in Mozambique provides a 
framework through which current political structures and beliefs can be more accurately 
interpreted.  For this reason, a review of Mozambican political history and government 
structure is in order.  Prior to the establishment of a central government by the Portuguese 
colonists, the territory of which Mozambique consists occupied by various indigenous 
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people groups concentrated along the fertile Zambezi River valley.  These groups, mainly 
composed of Sena, Tawara, Zimba and Tonga speakers, were organized into independent 
chieftaincies.  Most of the chieftaincies were ruled by individual mambos “who possessed 
important ritual powers and political functions.”74   
Kingdoms from present-day Zimbabwe and South Africa frequently threatened 
the region.  Most notable are the conquests of the Karangan Mutota and his son, Mutapa.   
Their empire was at its height just before the expansion of the Portuguese into southern 
Africa in the fifteenth century.  This empire penetrated deep into central Mozambique, 
with only the most northern and southern reaches untouched.75  At the local level, 
Mutapa maintained the system of mambos.  At provincial levels he appointed trusted 
family members as governors.  With such a vast empire, cohesion and communication 
were difficult.  Loyalty was maintained by sending sons of mambos to the king as 
ransom.  When threatened by war, mambos recruited warriors to defend Mutapa as well 
as the local territory.  In central Mozambique, this was the status quo when the 
Portuguese arrived.   
Other regions of present-day Mozambique had different structures.  The Undi 
ruled present-day Tete province.  The mambos in that region had more responsibility for 
their people than Mutapa’s empire afforded the mambos.  Under the Undi, each mambo 
“was held responsible in his chieftaincy for settling disputes, directing rain and harvest 
ceremonies, and defending the Undi state.”76  They were also in charge of distributing 
land to followers and collecting tribute.  Central Undi authority was weak due to the 
strength of the local authorities.  Close to the time of the Portuguese arrival in the region, 
the Undi fell to the Chewa of present-day Malawi.  Other chieftaincies existed in 
Mozambique further north in Nyasa, which had similar structures of mambos with no 
centralized governance.  When the Portuguese arrived, “they were met not by cohesive 
states bent on unified resistance but by a hotchpotch of badly fragmented political units in 
various degrees of decline, some of them eager for a European alliance against covetous 
                                                 
74 Thomas Henriksen,  Mozambique: A History, (London: Rex Collins, 1978) 4.   
75 Ibid 7.  See also Henriksen footnote number 6, which suggests that some scholars believe the 
conquest was not as expansive as suggested by the Portuguese.   
76 Henriksen 14.   
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neighbours.”77  Portuguese policy from the beginning of the sixteenth century was less of 
a policy of settlement and conquest than a policy of influencing and controlling African 
chieftaincies, playing off their rivalries and weaknesses.78 
2. Colonial Mozambican Political Structure 
Vasco de Gama was the first European to set foot in Mozambique in 1498 in his 
pursuit of a trade route to the Far East. By this time Arab and Indian traders were already 
present along the coast and involved in trade.  In Mozambique’s Zambezi River valley, 
some Europeans and Indians completely integrated into the African societies, becoming 
chiefs and landholders.  By the nineteenth century, the descendants of the Europeans and 
Indians, along with newly introduced Portuguese settlers, were powerful leaders in a 
feudal prazo system in which plantations or territory was ruled by individual prazeiros.  
The prazeiros maintained close ties with the local chiefs, often because their land was 
given to them by the chief, or because they were related by blood.  When there was no 
chief in the locality of the prazo, the prazeiro was granted judicial rights over all the 
inhabitants of his land, ruling it like a small fiefdom.  In fact, it is possible that the 
prazeiro “was expected to perform some of the ritual functions of chieftaincy.”79 Limited 
by the need for tribute and the freedom of inhabitants to move at any time, prazeiros 
were forced to adapt to and maintain traditional economic and political practices and 
adopt practices that were favorable to the indigenous people. 
Between 1895 and 1930, the Portuguese government passed and enforced the 
Colonial Act with the intent of encouraging more Portuguese to go to Mozambique.  Up 
to that time, settlers had only been arriving in small numbers and the colony was ruled by 
prazeiros in some regions, trade companies in others and essentially white chiefs loyal to 
the crown in others.80  By 1914, the Portuguese attempts at subduing the indigenous 
population were for the most part successful and they began the more difficult task of 
                                                 
77 Henriksen 16. 
78 Malyn Newitt, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years (London: Longman Group Limited, 
1981) 54. 
79 Malyn D. D. Newitt, “The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo 
System,” The Journal of African History 10, 1 (1969) 76.  Newitt has written extensively on the history of 
Mozambique with particular emphasis on the Portuguese involvement.  The information contained in this 
paragraph comes from “Portuguese on the Zambezi.” 
80 James Duffy,  Portuguese Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) 248. 
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administering the colony.81  Unfortunately for Portugal, the colony was more of a drain 
on its finances instead of a wise investment.  Each new Portuguese ruler sought to change 
the circumstance and make its colony profitable, but their efforts rarely succeeded, 
allowing Mozambique under the prazeiros and white chiefs more and more autonomy.  
This was Mozambique’s first experience with the modern, albeit weak, state. 
To more effectively rule the colony, the Portuguese divided rural Mozambican 
territory into divisions over which resided a pre-existing régulo or chief.  Mozambican 
traditional authority institutions had persisted throughout the years of early colonization, 
and now they were legally incorporated into the colonial state.  According to Portuguese 
colonial law in 1933, “in each of the local regions, authority over the native population 
[would] be exercised by an indigenous administrative authority (or régulo).”82  The 1933 
law and another law passed in 1954 declared that traditional authorities should be 
compensated for exercising their duties.83  At the local level, traditional authorities 
functioned as the government.  At this time, Jamal argues that the institution of traditional 
authority had three identifying characteristics – its authority on rules regarding 
inheritance of leadership positions and traditional culture/mythology; its persistence and 
entrenchment in society; and its universal acceptance.84   
3. Post-independence Political Structures 
When the Portuguese government gave Mozambique its independence in 1975, 
they passed governing responsibilities to the Frente de Liberaçao de Moçambique 
(Frelimo).  Frelimo had fought the Portuguese for independence, after which it 
established an Afro-Marxist regime with a party-centered approach to societal reordering.  
Former institutions based on class or ethnicity were broken down and realigned into new 
institutions based on farmer cooperatives, collective villages and worker-controlled 
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enterprises.85  Frelimo attempted to remove traditional authorities from their positions 
and replace them with party-appointed leaders called secretaries and leadership 
collectives called Grupos Dinamizadors.  Renamo, the rebel militia that took form soon 
after independence in opposition to the ruling party, responded by propping up traditional 
authorities in the territory it controlled, empowering them as both local leaders and 
Renamo representatives.  In these ways, Mozambique’s centuries-old traditional authority 
structures became embroiled in civil war and subsequently party politics. 
 Unlike Frelimo’s policy of breaking down traditional institutions and regrouping 
society around Marxist ideals, Renamo policy attempted to orchestrate a “revival of 
traditional authority” as well as to strengthen traditional institutions, using them to their 
advantage.86  Research shows that in some areas of northern Mozambique, chiefs 
disgruntled by Frelimo’s policy welcomed Renamo and facilitated their broader 
acceptance in society.87  When the war ended and political and social reconstruction 
began, the position of traditional authorities was defined within the new regime.  In 1990 
the socialist constitution was replaced with a liberal democratic constitution.  
Nevertheless, “the underlying assumption, rarely articulated but even more rarely 
challenged, was that somewhere within newly created political spaces, ‘traditional 
authority’ would once more play a role in local governance.  If people were permitted to 
elect local authorities, and if ‘traditional authorities’ were, indeed, considered ‘legitimate’ 
by local populations, people might then elect their chiefs to local office, repairing the 
divide between ‘traditional’ and modern forms of authority.”88  This unspoken 
arrangement is apparent in the way the government is organized at the local level. 
Mozambique is divided into eleven provinces and within each province the 
system is broken down into districts, administrative posts and localities.  Local 
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government structures are present in only a portion of Mozambique, although under the 
policy of gradualism, as “capacity develops, further central government responsibilities 
are to be transferred to ‘local organs of state’.”89  Under the Constitution there are two 
types of local authority – those in the city and those in rural areas.  The task of the local 
authorities is to “organize the participation of citizens in finding a solution to the 
community problems, to promote local development, and to strengthen and consolidate 
democracy within the framework of Mozambican state unity.”90  The government has 
also defined the role of community authorities, not to be confused with local authorities. 
Community authorities are defined as “traditional chiefs and other leaders recognized by 
their respective local communities.”91  In 2000 the Mozambican parliament passed a law 
that formalized the role of community authorities and made them official members of the 
state apparatus.  The government’s purpose in formalizing the role of the community 
authorities is two-fold.  First, they “are envisaged as functioning as ‘civil society’ or 
community representatives, giving voice to and catering for the needs of rural 
constituencies that have been relatively ‘voiceless’ so far.”92  Their secondary role is one 
of ‘mediator,’ providing assistance as an entry point into the community in rural or semi-
urban areas for business, aid agencies and state functions.93  These aggregate of the laws 
passed regarding traditional authority place them in positions of leadership as both 
members of civil society and members of the state apparatus – they have dual roles. 
Though government has delineated a role for the community authorities in rural areas, the 
laws are problematic, particularly in regards to defining who is a traditional authority and 
thus deserves the official title of community authority, and who is not. 
During different periods in Mozambique’s history and in different regions of the 
country, various terms have been used to describe individuals with some sort of 
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traditional authority role – régulo, régulo verdadeiro, chefe, mambo, and autoridade 
gentilica to name a few.  The June 2000 law (Decree 15/2000) delineated how 
community authorities were to be identified.  The objective of the decree was to 
strengthen state sovereignty “by extending administrative and territorial reach to rural 
areas with the recognition and delegation of tasks to localized forms of organization.”94  
The decree outlined the process by which community authorities would be selected, with 
the intent of preserving local customs and political ideals.95  Buur suggests that this law 
adheres to a strict communitarian perspective, which maintains “a view of community as 
based on solidarity, and as self-contained and structured around attachment to shared 
political ideals.”96  However, “such notions are unsuited for understanding social reality 
in general and the Mozambican case specifically. . .  No serious thought is given to 
differences and potential conflicts within communities. . .”97  The state, by incorporating 
traditional authorities into the government, is mixed regime-type that could alienate the 
youth.  In time, this alienation could undermine the extent to which the youth support the 
current democratic regime.  Over time, the lack of support for the dual regime, could 
result in resistance and perceptions of illegitimacy from the youth.  This thesis will 
address one issue that could lead to future discord in society– disconnect between the 
political ideals of youth and the older generation in rural areas.   
 
C. CONTEXT OF STUDY 
1. Rural Areas 
One of the defining features of the African political and social situation is the 
disparity between the development and political inclusion of rural areas compared to 
urban settings.  Historically, African states have had difficulty extending authority from 
the center outward.  Due to constraints such as geographical boundaries and limited 
infrastructure, the further away one is from the capital or an urban center, the less reach 
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and influence the government has on its population.98  Decades of state incapacity to 
penetrate rural areas has led to a great divergence in the political developmental paths of 
rural and urban areas.   This is the case in Mozambique. 
Southern Mozambique is home to the capital, Maputo, and the most economically 
prosperous province in the country, Maputo Province.  The country is divided informally 
into three regions, the South, Center and the North.  The North, the subject of this thesis, 
is comprised of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces. The North and North-
Center of Mozambique is more rural and underdeveloped than the South.99  The 1997 
national census, over 70% of the population lived in rural areas.100  It is currently 
estimated that over 80% of the population lives in rural areas.101  Immediately following 
independence, the new Mozambican government comprised of the Frelimo party had 
very limited reach into North, particularly in the rural areas.  In the 1990s, the Renamo 
political party still dominated the North and Center.102  In these rural areas where the 
state is weak, opportunities to put democracy into practice have been limited.  Rural 
inhabitants rely on other sources for political leadership such as religious or traditional 
authorities to address their needs rather than the state.103   
2. Youth in Mozambican Society 
Mozambican society is young.  While current, accurate statistical data is difficult 
to ascertain, it is estimated that nearly forty-five percent of the population is under the 
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age of fifteen (2002 data).104  An equally large proportion of the population is between 
the ages of fifteen and fourty-nine (1997 data).105  In 1997, the mean age of the 
Mozambican population was 17.5.106  Thus youth, the focus of this study, comprise a 
large sector of society.  The Portuguese term jovem is used to describe youth in 
Mozambique, though it often includes young adults up to age thirty.  This study focuses 
on youth aged 18-30.  Most studies of youth in Mozambique have focused on the child 
soldier, the effects of war on youth and issues relating to reintegration into society.  
Today’s Mozambican youth were children and babies during the war and were raised in a 
country at peace.  Today’s youth have different characteristics from those studied in the 
immediate post-war years.  Post-war youth were marked by gross inaccess to education, 
physical and/or mental trauma, physical relocation as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
or refugees with disrupted family structures.  Current issues related to Mozambican youth 
are the continued inaccess to education, unemployment and the growing concern of 
HIV/AIDS.107  There is a notable gap in the information and literature available and 
readily accessible on the role of youth in Mozambican political society, particularly those 
in rural areas.  UNICEF planned to publish in February 2005 extensive research on the 
“Situation Analysis of Youth and Adolescents in Mozambique: Focus on District and 
Rural Level.”  At the time of this writing, however, the publication had yet to be released.   
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III. LEGITIMATE POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN RURAL 
MOZAMBIQUE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Rural Mozambique is in the process of slowly being integrated into formal 
government structures that are effective and do not exist on paper only.  Historically rural 
dwellers have been excluded from formal government processes.  As the state seeks to 
extend its authority into rural areas, it has incorporated traditional authorities into the 
state apparatus, de jura, by codifying their role in Mozambican law.  In this instance, the 
government assumes that most rural dwellers consider the existing traditional regimes 
with the incorporation of traditional institutions to be legitimate.   Before delving into the 
accuracy of these claims, the primary focus of thus project, it is important to recall that 
authority is pluralistic.  Thus, all individuals in positions of authority derive their 
legitimacy from various sources.  Individuals may identify the legitimacy of authority or, 
as in this case regime, based on more than one individually-held political ideal.   
 Foundational to the legitimacy of regimes is the extent to which the decisions that 
result from the processes within the regime and the regime’s role in society correspond to 
the political ideals of individuals in that society.  In this case, understanding the political 
ideals of youth and older adults provides insight into the extent to which some types of 
regimes are more legitimate than others.  One of the main findings of this chapter is that 
both rural older adults and youth agree that government leaders at the local level should 
come from the community over which they have authority.  Politically, the overall 
opinion is that the most qualified leaders are those who “know” the community and its 
needs the best.  However, beliefs about the legitimate way for rural leaders to achieve and 
exercise their authority varies according to age group.  The duality in regime-types at the 
local level – traditional and centrally democratic – is the environment in which individual 
political ideals can be studied.  The values of individuals can be compared against those 
values manifested in the regime-types that exist at the local level. 
 The youth and older adults both place great political confidence and legitimacy in 
leaders who are familiar with their constituents and understand the needs of the people as 
opposed to those who are outsiders from a different province or, at the local level, from a 
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different locality.  Both generations also suggest that leaders should be selected by those 
who know the qualifications necessary for the position and are familiar with the behavior 
of the individual who want the political positions.  According to rural dwellers, the 
person most qualified for a position of leadership is one who is most familiar with the 
position’s requirements and most closely knows the people with whom they will be 
working and directing, which, depending on the circumstances or level of responsibility, 
could be a leader’s own constituents or other government officials.    
 While youth and older adults agree on this point, they differ in regards to who 
decides how “qualified,” most “familiar” and most closely “knows” are defined.  That is, 
they agree on the principles of what legitimacy is, but not the mechanics of how 
legitimate rulers are selected.  In essence, they believe in different forms of rule: one 
through inheritance and one through election.  The political ideals of youth lean toward 
control and choice – they are more concerned with the procedural elements of how their 
representatives are chosen.  The application of democratic procedural elements makes a 
leader legitimate.  If youth had choices presented to them in who should be a leader and 
then were able to have a measure of influence and control in the decision, the leader is 
more legitimate.  At a broader level, youth believe a consistently democratic regime is the 
most legitimate regime.   
 Older adults, in contrast, place greater value in how much knowledge and power a 
leader possesses, and thus their perceptions of legitimacy are based on the qualifications 
of the leaders who inhabit positions, more so than the strict selection criteria in a formally 
meritorious and democratic system.  In contrast to the youth, the leader’s legitimacy is 
not based on whether or not they were elected, but that leader leads with authority and 
power once he has achieved a position.  At the same time, however, there is an element of 
legitimacy inherent in the selection process.  As the results reveal, part of what makes a 
ruler qualified is the training he received as a member of a family that traditionally rules, 
and which therefore trains its sons to exercise power from a young age.  The emphasis, 
however, is that a tradition of coming to power through inheritances, with the weight of 
the legitimacy resting in beliefs about the legitimacy of the process and decisions of the 
ruling family, makes a leader better qualified.  At the local level, the ideals of the older 
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generation manifest themselves in the acceptance of the legitimacy of traditional 
authorities.   
 
B. PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY AMONG RURAL ADULTS 
In rural areas of Mozambique, it is generally thought that the population considers 
traditional authorities the legitimate representatives of the local communities.  “The 
people” consider the régulo a person of good faith who is generally accepted as a person 
in which much trust and confidence is placed.  Régulos and traditional leaders, usually 
elders, are sought out directly to deal with conflicts relating to tradition or domestic 
issues.  Pereira suggests that this is because traditional authorities are not supposed to be 
attached to any political party and therefore are the most neutral political institution at the 
local level.108  These traditional institutions also have a long history of influential 
decision-making.  It is suggested that the people only do what the traditional organs say  
because they were not appointed or elected, but their power comes from 
their inherited position or the trust of the people; the people see them as 
“God,” because they are individuals that know the ways and customs of 
their area and also the traditions.  When there is a conflict, only these 
[traditional] elements should resolve them.109   
My research corroborates Pereira’s primary research only in regards to older adults. 
However, younger members of rural society do not share these views. 
My primary research found that older adults in rural areas highly regard and 
respect traditional authorities.  According to the adult focus group participants, these 
authorities achieve their positions through the traditional means of being appointed by 
family members.  The position of régulo usually stays in the same family.  As a régulo 
ages and a new one needs to be selected, the older members of the family gather together 
and select the successor.110  As the one appointed by the family to lead, the community 
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34 
feels free to approach him.  A group of older women reported that they approach the 
régulo to resolve issues because “he is a respected person and the one responsible.”111  
Because régulos are native members of the community and understand the dynamics and 
specific traditions practiced therein, participants considered the régulo to be especially 
suited to govern.   
The trust and confidence placed in traditional authority by adults is also 
demonstrated by the fact that older adults are more likely than youth to approach the 
régulo or cabo to resolve personal or community problems and issues.  Regardless of 
whether or not an issue is under the legal jurisdiction of the secretary or cabo, there is a 
distinct difference in who each generation approaches to resolve those issues.112  In a 
majority of the scenarios presented in the focus groups (See Question 9 of the interview 
questions), the older adults chose to approach the cabo first.  “The cabo has 
knowledge”113 and, in the rural areas, power.114 
One particular group of older men near Rapale is noted for their awareness of the 
duality of the government system at the rural, local level.  These men recognize that the 
régulo is an official member of the state.  Therefore, by approaching him to resolve 
issues, they are not working outside the state apparatus.  They also recognize the 
secretary as a member of the state, but are less willing to approach him with issues.  The 
régulo is their leader of choice.  They acknowledge that the régulo is not elected and the 
secretary is, but this status quo is preferred when faced with the decision of whether or 
not they would like to vote on who should be régulo.  The regular is inherently legitimate 
because the older adults value the traditional regime type.  Among all older adults with 
the exception of one group of women, none could conceive of the régulo or person with 
similar authority being elected by the people.   Thus, even within the government 
apparatus, the older members of rural society did not desire the position of régulo, or a 
                                                 
111 Author interview with rural older women, Niapala, 13 August 2006. 
112 Indeed, in rural Mozambican society the people are often unaware of laws regarding jurisdiction 
and leadership responsibility, which may cause them to be free of any obligation they may otherwise feel to 
approach the authorities that actually hold jurisdiction in certain matters. 
113 Author interview with rural older men, Niapala, 13 August 2006. 
114 Author interview with rural older women, Nampula Barragem, 6 August 2006. 
35 
leadership position that held similar responsibilities, to be contested through an 
election.115   
The traditional authorities were considered legitimate because they belonged to a 
family that traditionally has held the leadership roles in the community.  The adults 
perceived that the traditional authorities were selected by their family based on their 
leadership capability and competence.  Even in cases where adults did not mention the 
leadership ability or competence of the traditional authority, they still stated that they 
would go to the traditional authority to address issues.  A typical response from adults in 
regards to whether or not they think a traditional regimes in their area is preferable to a 
more democratic regimes type is as follows: “How it is now is an old tradition.  This way 
is how it is.”116  After a group of older women in at the Barragem stated that they 
preferred to elect the secretary, they were asked the following question: “So, you said you 
preferred that the secretary was elected.  Now, in regards to the cabo, would you prefer 
that he be elected or not?”  They responded, “Here, with the cabo, there is a difference 
between the leaders.  With the capo it has to do with his family.”  The older adults did not 
think the traditional regime was illegitimate.117 Adults respected and honored the 
authorities that worked within the traditional regime.  They saw those leaders as 
effective, as evidenced by the fact that they stated they habitually approach the traditional 
authority first, in lieu of the secretary, to address problems and issues within the 
community.   
While Mozambique is not considered fully democratic, the institutional 
expression of the current democratic regime type is embodied in the positions of 
secretaries, post chiefs, provincial governors and other more local positions.118  In 
Chapter Two it was noted that régulos and cabos are also official representatives of the 
                                                 
115 In Niapala, in contrast to the other areas, the older women stated that they would not mind if the 
position of régulo was contested through an election, “though there isn’t a big problem [with how it is] 
now. . . We like how it is now.” Author interview with rural older women, Niapala, 13 August 2006. 
116 Older men in Niapala, Author interview, 13 August 2006. 
117 “The family with the lineage would get together and decide who will be the capo.  If the family 
appoints him and other people and families say “Hey, look at who they chose [we don’t like him.]”  This 
happens.  You just say, hey, this is the regulo and leave it at that.”     
118 According to the 2006 Freedom House index, Mozambique is considered partly free.  It scored 3 
for political rights and 4 for civil liberties, on a scale of one to seven with 1 being the most free and 7 being 
the least free.  http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf  Accessed 18 September 2006 
36 
government, but in this context they have been referred to as traditional authorities to 
differentiate them from other government structures.  Most local government positions 
are gained through appointment.  The President of the Republic and national 
parliamentarians are the only officials that rural dwellers have the opportunity to elect.119  
Currently, most secretaries are members of the political party in power and are appointed 
by their district or higher authority.   
Among focus group participants, the secretary was universally recognized as the 
official state representative in the community.  As a leader appointed by the party or 
provincial government, he is not part of the traditional regime.  Most older adults could 
not even conceive of an elected or government-appointed individual entitled to carry out 
the responsibilities of a traditional authority.  The position of secretary was important, but 
its role was considered distinctly different than that of the traditional authority.  In the 
opinion of the older adults, the position of secretary would best be selected by a local 
election.  Members of their community should present themselves to be nominated for the 
position of secretary and the community would vote by a show of hands or on a ballot.  
The individual with the most votes would become the secretary.  This assumes that the 
community knows the individuals seeking the position of leadership and will be a good 
judge of how powerful and knowledgeable that leader will be.    
Under the current system, the participants expressed that they often did not know 
their secretary or the secretary was not from their community.  Across the different focus 
groups, participants reiterated that they would like to vote because they would know the 
comportamento of the individual.  Comportamento is the conduct or behavior of a person.  
Voting “is better because we can see his comportamento.  If he’s bad, we hear about it.  
We can know if that one there isn’t good.”120  This is an understandable reaction to the 
current system in which appointments are made in return for political favor, often 
regardless of the individual’s qualifications or prior experience.   
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In some of the rural areas in which research was conducted, the participants stated 
that their secretaries were elected by the community.  For the adults who were able to 
vote, they were pleased that they could express their personal choice.  “[Voting for the 
secretary] is better [than appointment] because we can see his behavior.”  At the local 
level, the elders, like the youth, preferred to vote for their secretary.  Democratically 
elected leaders at the local level were also legitimate.  However, when the voting option 
was considered for the traditional authority or government officials at higher levels, its 
value decreased.  The adults thought the family of the régulo, not the community, should 
appoint the traditional authority. The further detached a political authority was from the 
local community, the more inclined individuals were to default the selection process to 
someone else at a higher level.  Thus the duality of regimes at the local level was 
acknowledged, with the democratic and traditional regimes interacting.  The dual system 
was preferred over a system in which all leaders were democratically elected or only 
traditional leaders had authority at the local level.   
 
C. PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY AMONG RURAL YOUTH 
At the local level, youth have strong preferences on how the government should 
or should not continue to function.121  In every rural community, traditional authorities 
are present.  The extent to which these authorities exercise power and political authority 
varies, but is nevertheless influential.  Little research has been conducted in the area of 
the interaction between youth and traditional authorities in the areas where the authorities 
function as formalized, government institutions.  One NDI study conducted in 1996 
offers some limited insight into rural youth perceptions of traditional authority.  Youth 
participants in NDI focus groups did “not know this traditional authority or even its 
rules.”122  The sentiment of the youth was that traditional authority “belongs to old 
times.”123  Traditional authority was declared outdated and irrelevant.  Thus, while the 
samples used for this research are small and the region in question relatively minute 
                                                 
121 Youth participants often mentioned the role of governor, directors, administrators and other 
government posts at the local and provincial level.  Though some were relatively uneducated, all youth 
stated that the government had some responsibility toward them. 
122 On the Road to Local Elections,  (National Democratic Institute, February 1996) 5. 
123 Ibid. 
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compared to the vast rural areas of northern Mozambique, the results nevertheless 
provide valuable insight into the views and opinions of rural youth.  All youth focus 
group participants were engaged in the discussion and willing to share their views and 
ideas.  Most importantly, they were glad to know that someone actually cared what they 
think.   
The opinions of rural youth concerning traditional authorities were similar across 
participants.  With the exception of one individual female youth, all the twenty-one 
participants from four different regions favored approaching the secretary with all 
problems and issues in their community, including issues traditionally addressed by the 
régulo or cabo.  These responses are consistent with the complaint of one older man in 
Rapale, who stated that the “youth don’t go to the cabo. They go directly to the secretary 
or the police.”124  Youth explained that they prefer to go to the secretary because he has 
more authority, particularly in matters that must be referred to judiciary bodies or 
governing bodies in the city, where the secretary has ties and the cabo does not.  The 
youth stated that the authority of the secretary was ultimately derived from the members 
of parliament and the president, who are elected.  While the secretary was not directly 
elected, which would be preferable, he was still more legitimate than the traditional 
authorities.  While in most communities the secretaries are not directly elected, the fact 
that they have been appointed by elected members of the government gives them more 
legitimacy that the traditional authorities, who are not elected or appointed by elected 
leaders.  When asked how they would address an issue in which the secretary and cabo 
disagreed on a decision, one female participant stated that “[the cabo] only has a say in 
[his] family.  He’s not in accord with the government.  He’s not part of the 
government.”125  The youth were more willing to have someone they recognized as a 
authority, who achieved their position through some semblance of a democratic regime, 
address their grievances than a traditional authority.  They recognized the legitimacy of 
the regime that appointed the local government representatives.   
When questioned on the manner in which traditional authorities achieve their 
positions, youth respond with much disapproval.  “For the régulo it would be better to 
                                                 
124 Author interview with rural older men, Rapale district, 5 August 2006. 
125 Author interview with rural female youth, 10 August 2006. 
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vote, but the régulo, with his origins, he only gets power that way. . .”126  Authority 
through lineage, in this instance, was seen as a shortcoming.   Possessing a “royal” 
lineage and then being appointed by the “royal” family was not considered sufficient to 
grant an individual leadership authority.127  To some youth, the régulo seemed distant 
and unapproachable.  Nevertheless, the régulos was still considered an important figure 
with whom the secretary or government officials should consult of they desired or needed 
assistance.  The traditional authorities were seen as honored members of society who 
could offer sound advice, but not leaders in society who, if part of the traditional regime, 
should have political power. 
The primary concern youth had with leaders who were not directly elected, 
traditional leaders and local secretaries alike, is that they may be incapable or unwilling 
to lead the way the youth think they should lead.  “Sometimes those who come into 
positions without being elected are not capable.”128  In some cases, the traditional 
authorities are seen as more than incapable – in the eyes of the youth they are corrupt.  “If 
the cabo is selected by this family, he does not judge justly.  If something [unjust is going 
on] in the family he will not resolve it.  If he was elected he would see that his job is in 
the government and his word is second to the law.”129  Elected officials, in the opinion of 
the youth, would be more likely to obey the law and govern justly with the possibility 
that they may lose the next election.  While the secretaries are often not directly elected, 
as previously noted, their leadership is preferable to that of the traditional authorities. 
In regards to traditional authority then, youth do not perceive these authorities to 
be inherently legitimate.  They perceive elected authorities, or those who have been 
appointed by the democratic regime, to be more legitimate because they have had a 
measure of choice and control in the process.  Youth thought they themselves and the 
community at large could be a better judge of who should lead than a “royal” family or a 
higher government official unfamiliar with the locality.  In regards to traditional 
                                                 
126 Author interview with rural male youth, Monapo district, 3 August 2006. 
127 The term “royal” is used to describe the family that is originally descendent from kings and chiefs.  
While these families still possess this heritage and a certain amount of respect, they are not treated as 
royalty in the traditional sense of the word. 
128 Author interview with male youth near Monapo, 3 August 2006.   
129 Author interview with female youth near Nampula Barragem, 6 August 2006. 
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authority, these findings corroborate with the 1993 October Household Surveys statistical 
data in rural South Africa in which 30,000 households were visited.  Of all age groups 
surveyed, youth were the “least supportive of an important role for traditional leaders, 
whereas the older age-group (seventy plus) is substantially more supportive.”130  The 
older adults who participated in the focus groups in Mozambique were significantly 
younger than the older age group accounted for in the South African census, and thus the 
Mozambican participants and their opinions represent a greater portion of the population 
than the opinions of the South Africans.  In contrast to the views of the older generation, 
youth participants were more supportive of requiring an election for a position than older 
respondents.131  Thus the situation of youth in rural Nampula Province appears to be 
similar to other areas of Africa. 
The youth thought they should be the judge of who “knows” the community.  
Their judgment could then be expressed in the form of a vote.  Like the older generation, 
the youth also believe that an individual seeking a position of authority should be the one 
most familiar with the position and have the most respectable behavior.  In contrast to the 
view of the elders, however, they believe every individual should be able to make the 
judgment call of whether a person is qualified or not through a voting process. The 
privilege of determining who most is qualified and well-behaved is not deferred to those 
who “know him the best,” as is the case with the elders.  The youth, regardless of 
education level, gender, or location, desired that all local government officials be elected.  
They believed they had sense enough to elect the best person for the job.  They would 
want to know about candidates and decide individually who should hold an office.  In 
their own words, “everyone knows in their heart who they want in the position.”   
The youth universally desired to vote for their local authorities.  “The person 
chosen to lead has to be a person the people validated and saw that he would be a good 
leader.”  In contrast to the régulo, who “takes the authority from his relatives that have 
died,”132 youth considered the authority of elected leaders to be derived from the voting 
process.  In the cases where the local secretary was elected, youth stated that he should be 
                                                 
130 Crothers in Ray and Reddy 75. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Author interview with rural male youth near Monapo, 3 August 2006. 
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obeyed because “he was given authority by those who chose him.”133  Even non-directly 
elected government figures were considered more legitimate than the régulo because they 
were at least appointed by the party, which ultimately derives its power from the 
presidential vote.   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Perceptions of what constitutes a legitimate political authority differ across 
generations in rural Nampula Province.  Youth consider a political authority to be 
legitimate based on procedural elements of selection.  If a leader at any level is elected, 
youth consider them to be the legitimate authority.  If that person does not perform well, 
he will not win re-election and their authority will not be re-legitimized.  This is the 
essence of a democratic regime, the regime-type youth prefer over the other alternative of 
a traditional regime at the local level.  Older adults consider both the traditional regime 
and the democratic regime at the local levels to be legitimate and compatible.  The 
traditional authorities continue to achieve their positions in a traditional manner because 
that has been, in the words of the elders, “effective and they know their job and the 
community the best.”  In regards to traditional authorities, it is how it has always been 
and should not be changed.  The older adults would prefer that the secretaries be elected, 
however.  Thus, the older adults accept the integration of dual regimes – traditional and 
democratic – at the local level, while the youth would prefer that only the democratic 
regime type be practiced. 
In rural areas, where the role of traditional authorities is the most prominent, a 
generational disconnect in political ideals and understanding of legitimate regime types 
could undermine the future of currently established institutions of authority.  The current 
institutions of traditional authority in rural areas are founded on political ideals that the 
current youth, who will assume leadership roles in society in the future, do not accept as 
their own.  Youth do not accept the inherent legitimacy of traditional authority.  Their 
political ideals do not include the ideal of authority being inherently legitimate.  It is 
legitimate based on the procedural elements of freedom of choice and elections – political 
ideals youth highly value.  For youth, the traditional regime type the institutions 
                                                 
133 Author interview with rural male youth near Monapo, 3 August 2006. 
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invariably incorporated into that regime type should no longer have a role in local 
community politics or in the regime at large.  The youth express their ideals by 
marginalizing traditional authorities in the political processes in which they participate.   
Many members of the older generation accept the traditional regimes at the local 
level as inherently legitimate.  They value the historical heritage traditional leaders 
possess and see it as relevant for today.  However, they also value having a choice in the 
selection of leaders who will have influence in their communities – if those leaders are 
outside the realm of the traditional regime.  Thus the alternative regime type – democracy 
– is also acceptable if it does not marginalize the traditional authority or discourage 
individuals from approaching them if they so desire.  The existence of dual regimes at the 
local level is acceptable to the older generation and even preferable than the existence of 


























This project initially set out to interrogate an assumption that underlies many 
discussions of democracy, democratization and power in Africa: that rural people believe 
that traditional rulers are a legitimate form of rule.  Most analyses of democracy and 
democratization assume that traditional rulers must be accommodated in state structures 
in order to maintain effectiveness and legitimacy, basically creating a hybrid regime that 
incorporates fundamentally different modes of legitimation: officially meritocratic 
election versus familial inheritance and selection.  These ideas, however, rest on a 
relatively dated view of “rural people” that does not account for generational differences 
that may have emerged in the past decade or two.  The thesis therefore set out to show 
that the youth, even in rural areas, tend not to consider traditional authority to be a 
legitimate regime type, and therefore to proffer an alternate claim that research and 
policies should not just assume that all rural people hold the same opinions of what 
constitutes legitimate rule.  People in rural areas have different perceptions of what 
regime types are legitimate and which are not. 
 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The assumption within African states that traditional authorities are inherently 
legitimate in rural areas has implications for the future of the development of government 
at the local level.  In 2000 the government of Mozambique recognized that the traditional 
regimes were influential in rural areas.  As a result, it declared that they would be 
transitionally incorporated into the democratic regime.  However, the two regime types 
are distinctly different.  One of the defining factors of the traditional regime is that its 
authorities are not elected, whereas within the democratic regime they are.  The 
government is in practice promoting two different regime types within one state, which 
has implications for the way in which the state seeks to legitimate its rule and can 
exercise authority.  Among the older adults, this duality is acceptable and legitimate.  In 
the opinion of rural youth, however, it is not.  Among youth, the majority of whom think 
traditional authorities are illegitimate as a regime-type within the state, there is the 
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potential for a rejection of the regime at the local level.  The existence of dual regimes at 
the local level could lead to perceptions of illegitimacy of the regime overall.  A growth 
in the perceptions of illegitimacy of the regime could lead to perceptions of the 
illegitimacy of the state.   
Initially states argued that integration of traditional regimes was essential for rural 
areas to buy into the system.  For older citizens in rural areas, this may have been an 
effective means to legitimize the regime and state overall.  However, as youth adopt 
differing perceptions of legitimacy, the integration of traditional authorities may serve to 
de-legitimize the existing regime and the state.  The system as it stands could weaken the 
state instead of strengthening it.  Another implication of the divergence in perceptions of 
legitimacy between generations is the potential for disenfranchising the youth.  Leaders 
in both regimes at the local level are adults, many of whom are working to promote the 
dual system Mozambique has established in law.  If youth do not accept the legitimacy of 
the traditional regime, their present role as political actors at the local level could be 
limited, causing discontent and unease. 
 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGENCE OF PERCEPTIONS 
Because the literature on legitimate regime types in Africa to date has treated 
rural people as an undifferentiated cohort and has not investigated whether there are 
generational distinctions in what they perceive of as legitimate regime types, this thesis 
focused on proving that there is a divergence between the younger and older generations 
in Mozambique.  The analysis demonstrated that these variations do exist and could 
potentially have far-reaching impacts on the legitimacy of local and even national 
government.  Because it was concerned with proving that “rural people” should not be 
treated as one block, this thesis did not focus on the important question of why the 
generations diverge in what they consider to be legitimate regime types.  Now that the 
thesis has shown that there is something to investigate, future research can now 
investigate why these divisions exist. 
As the literature review in Chapter One suggests, there are many factors that 
should be investigated for their potential to cause the difference in political ideals of 
youth and older adults and, as a result, their perceptions of legitimate regimes and 
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institutions.  In this section I lay out an agenda of possible sources that warrant future 
research.  First, much like the individuals in other countries that have experienced civil 
war, the views of today’s adults are probably framed by their experiences during 
Mozambique’s civil war, while the youth did not experience the many of the harsh 
realities of the war.  As a result, the older generation may value peace and stability more 
than democratic processes, which often involve competition and discord.  The experience 
of adults may cause them to desire peace at all costs, including peace within their 
communities.  If the current local state of affairs, which includes a dual system, is 
peaceful and functioning at a minimal level, adults may prefer it to a democratic regime 
which they have yet to experience in full - in which everyone has a voice, including those 
who may have radical ideas, and in which people compete with each other for positions 
of power.  The youth, in contrast, have arrived at early adulthood in an era of peace when 
discord does not automatically lead to war, and therefore they might have more tolerance 
for the institutionalized uncertainty and competition of a democratic regime. 
Second, the influence of global ideas of legitimacy and democracy on the youth, 
and the manner in which these ideas diffuse throughout society, should be considered in 
more depth. With greater access to media and education than the older generation, youth 
have been exposed to ideas that are becoming a reality across the continent.134  The value 
of individuality the youth have begun to espouse is evident in their desire to have each 
voice count equally in the selection of a leader.  Most often, these dynamics are assumed 
to operate among youths who have access to resources like cable and satellite television 
and the internet, i.e., youths in relatively urbanized locations.  The fact that this thesis 
found attitudes among rural, relatively non-globalized youths that approximate what is 
expected of urban youths begs for more research on why the rural youths have attitudes 
similar to what is expected from urban youths.  Because the diverging views of youth 
were the emphasis of this thesis, future research should evaluate the views of urban youth                                                  
134 For a review of the impact of increased access to education, globalization, development on youth, 
see Francis Chigunta, The Socio-Economic Situation of Youth in Africa: Problems, Prospects and Options 
Draft (University of Zambia: July 2002), http://www.yesweb.org/gkr/res/bg.africa.reg.doc Accessed May 
2006; see the essay written by CODESRIA’s Ali B. Ali-Dinar on the upcoming Youth and Identity in 
Africa Symposium scheduled for November 2006, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Current_Events/codes-
youth1206.html  Accessed 19 Sep 2006; see B. Nsamenang, “Adolescence in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Image constructed from Africa’s triple inheritance,” in B. B. Brown, R. Larson, and T.S. Saraswathi, eds. 
The World’s Youth: Adolescence in Eight Regions of the Globe, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 61-104. 
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as well.  The consistency of views among all Mozambican youth would have implications 
for the country as a whole, not just rural areas. 
Third, researchers should analyze the impact of party politics on perceptions of 
legitimacy. During the civil war, Frelimo and Renamo controlled distinct areas fo the 
country, and, as discussed in Chapter Two, used traditional authorities as pawns in the 
larger conflict.  Therefore, there could be enduring differences in the status of traditional 
rule and its legitimacy as a regime type that extend from the civil war era.  This potential 
factor is not as universal as the first two potential sources of divergence, as it will apply 
mostly to post-conflict scenarios in which combatants controlled distinct territories in the 
national unit.  The area in which the research was conducted was generally controlled by 
Renamo, and the party continues to be the party of preference for many citizens of the 
rural north.  During the war Renamo’s policy sought to support the role of traditional 
authorities in society.  Today’s older adults who were influenced by Renamo policy may 
continue to regard that as a reason to uphold traditional authority.  Renamo supporters, 
who are in general more poor and rural than Frelimo supporters, may be clinging to the 
one institution that has remained historically consistent.  Early Frelimo socialist policy 
imposed state farms and cooperatives and other collective institutions on the people that 
ultimately failed, giving the people no other alternative but to rely upon institutions that 
had functioned in the past.  As the political regime in Mozambique continues to transition 
into a democratic society, individuals skeptical of the change may continue to rely upon 
traditional authority as the primary legitimate governing institution.  Therefore, in order 
to investigate the impact of partisan attitudes, other localities in other provinces should be 
studied. 
 
D. THE SHAPING OF FUTURE PERCEPTIONS 
Much research also needs to be done to further elaborate the ideas presented in 
this thesis.  Most importantly, understanding the political ideals today should help 
political scientists determine how these will shape the future.  There are two primary 
possibilities in regards to how these perceptions of political authority will change with 
time.  One possibility is that the attitudes of today’s youth will evolve over time.  When 
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they reach older adulthood, they could have the same political ideals as today’s older 
adults in regards to the legitimacy of political authorities.   
In contrast, perhaps none of these previously discussed reasons – distance from 
the civil war, connection to the “developed” world, access to education and urban ideas, 
cross-cultural influence from overseas and party politics – explain the divergence.  
Another reason for the different perceptions across generations could be that the youth 
are still developing their ideals and thus their conceptions of political legitimacy.  The 
differences may purely be a function of their immature psychological development.  
David Easton and Jack Dennis have contributed significantly to the research on political 
socialization of children and youth.  In their words, “the role attitudes and behavior 
patterns about support that [the youth] acquires may conform to the expectations among 
adults about what a person should know and how he should behave.  Thereby his political 
awakening would contribute to the stability of the system.”135  In other words, youthful 
perceptions that initially diverge from the sentiments of adults come to approximate the 
views of their elders as the individuals mature.  People begin to form their views of 
political authority as children.  When they reach adulthood, those views may solidify and 
remain consistent.  Thus, perhaps the perceptions of the youth involved in this study are 
still formulating their political ideals and, when they reach older adulthood, their ideals 
will have evolved into the same ideals of today’s older adults.   
If this is the case, the perceptions of legitimate political authority continue to 
change into adult life and as this group of Mozambican youth mature, their perceptions 
will come to approximate those of the elder groups in the study.  The only way to know if 
this is truly the case would be to interview the same individuals who participated in this 
study periodically over the next two to three decades.  If their ideals and the resulting 
perceptions of legitimate political authority do evolve teleologically, political authorities 
within the regime will retain their legitimacy.  There is another possibility, however, in 
the political socialization process of youth. 
It is possible that the ideals of today’s youth have already been solidified.  If 
carried into adulthood, their views could transform the system.  The current system as it 
                                                 
135 David Easton and Jack Dennis. “Children in the Political System.” New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. 
389. 
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stands, which incorporates traditional authorities in which the youth do place significant 
legitimacy, could be rendered obsolete within a generation.  By formalizing and 
codifying the role of traditional authorities in society, the institution will be perpetuated, 
regardless of its relevance or perceived legitimacy.  If the political ideals of the youth 
remain consistent into adulthood, they will have the opportunity to change laws regarding 
traditional authority as they assume positions of authority within society.  If this occurs, 
society will look to today’s dualist system as a transition of legitimacy.  Therefore, 
additional research questions should address how perceptions change over time within 
the same group of people.  For example, have older adults always held these views, or 
have their views changed over time?  Similarly, will the views of today’s youth remain 
consistent or change with time? 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The current dual regime system at the local level is a result of legislative and 
constitutional engineering.  The initial goal of the system was to incorporate the rural 
areas into the state and establish a regime, or regimes, that were acceptable and legitimate 
in the eyes of the rural population.  As youth in rural areas, and in Mozambique at large, 
begin to play a greater role in the politics of the country as they come of age, the system 
may need to be re-evaluated.  The laws passed that establish the system in the rural areas 
should be re-assessed.  The Mozambican state needs to consider this crisis of legitimacy 
and how it will address the large portion of its population that may become 
disenfranchised as a result of its policy of integrating traditional authority into the regime. 
Outside non-governmental organization (NGOs) and foreign government projects 
can also apply this research to the application of their programs.  With the emphasis that 
many programs place on aiding African states to promote democratic regime 
consolidation, recognition must be made that the policies of the organizations may not 
always resonate with the people it is trying influence.  Programs sponsored by United 
States are of note.  In the context of perceptions of legitimacy, do U.S. policy and U.S.-
sponsored programs promote democracy in a manner that is compatible with the held 
views of the population they are trying influence?  After reviewing the primary evidence 
and research conducted in Mozambique, the answer is both yes and no.  Democracy 
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promotion programs are designed in such a way that they may resonate with and 
influence youth because the issue of democracy is approached from the perspective of 
similar foundational political ideals– the assumption that western, democratic institutions 
are more legitimate than traditional institutions.  In contrast, U.S.-sponsored programs 
will have more difficulty reaching and convincing older citizens of their value because 
older citizens place a greater relative value on traditional institutions.   
Once the perceptions of legitimate regimes are correctly understood, they can be 
framed in the context of their relevance to democratization efforts.  As Diamond has 
noted, “to be stable, democracy must be deemed legitimate by the people; they must view 
it as the best, most appropriate form of government for their society.  Indeed, because it 
rests on the consent of the governed, democracy depends on the popular legitimacy much 
more than any other form of government.”136  In regards to consolidation, the rural areas 
are the most unreached and marginalized in the democratic process. This is an aspect of 
democratization that demands more attention in U.S. policy.  Bratton et. al. note that 
“democratic regimes depend centrally on the creation and constant renewal of popular 
legitimacy.”137   Now that Mozambicans are living in peace, the government and 
organizations have the capacity to engage those in the rural areas who have been 
previously marginalized to gain a greater understanding of how popular legitimacy is 
created and renewed, which will further democratic consolidation efforts.  It is vital for 
policy makers to understand that in states where democracy is in the consolidation phase, 
acknowledging a generational division in perceptions of legitimate political regimes and 
institutions is important.  If the divide is recognized, policy and programs can be tailored 
to the appropriate audience.   
Understanding perceptions of political legitimacy is foundational to the 
development of the regime in Mozambique at all levels of the state – national, provincial 
and local.  While this thesis focuses on the local level, it provides a glimpse into the 
reality of how traditional institutions function as well as how deeply democracy has, or 
more realistically has not, penetrated rural society.  The political situation will inevitably 
                                                 
136 Larry Diamond. “Three Paradoxes of Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 1, 1 (1990) 56. 
137 Michael Bratton et al. 30.   
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continue to evolve.  The question remains: will the regime and the institutions therein 









APPENDIX A.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
[Note: Items in bold or italic were not verbalized during the interview.  Bold items 
provide an explanation and reasoning the questions asked.  Items in italics are for the 
interviewer only.] 
 
1.   How old are you? 
 
2.   Where were you born? 
 
3.   What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
4.  A.   What is the name of the person who represents your area in the government in 
Maputo? 
 If they know the answer to this question, it may be a signal that they 
understand how the government functions at different levels and can differentiate 
between national, provincial and local government. 
 
B. How was that person selected for that position? 
 If they answer “elected” ask if they voted and if they thought that was a good way 
to select someone to go to Maputo and represent then.  Then ask if they feel different 
about the authority now than they did before they had been elected. 
 
C. What is their primary job in Maputo? 
 
5.   A.   In your opinion, what is the role of the government?  
 
B. The people who perform that role, where are they located?  
 This question discerns who they consider the government (local, regional, 
national). 
 
C. In your opinion, do you think they/it do a good job? 
 
D. In this area, who works for the government?   
 These questions are to determine if they differentiate between those who in 
reality are employed by the government and those who serve in positions of 
authority but in reality do not represent the government.   
 
6. A.  What do you think the government in Maputo should do for you? 
  
 B.   How well does it do that? 
 These two questions are to discern whether people’s views of the government 




7. A.  What are the biggest problems in your community? 
 
 B.   Who do you think should address those issues?  Why? 
 The answer to this question will help determine who the person believes is 
most effective at solving issues.   
 






If the answer to any of these is ‘vote,’ ask if the interviewee voted.  If they did not vote, 
ask why. 
 






E. Are there other ways to choose a leader? 
 
If the answer to these questions is ‘not elected,’ follow up with the following question. 
 
F. Mozambique is considered a democracy.  Most of the time in a democracy the 
leaders are elected.  You said your leader is not elected.  Does that mean there is not 
democracy in your area?   
 These questions help determine what they perceive to be a relevant type of 
democracy for them.  Most interviewees were also asked “What does democracy 
mean to you?” 
 
8. A.  In your opinion, what is the best way to make someone a leader in your 
community? 
 
B.   In your opinion, what is the best way to make someone a leader for the province? 
 
C.   In your opinion, what is the best way to make someone a leader who works in the 
national government? 
 The aim of these questions is to discern whether people change their views of 
how people should be put into positions of authority when the position has greater 
or less impact on them. 
 
9.    In the following situations, who would you approach to address the issue? 
 Scenario 1 (economic issues):    
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A.   You want to open up a new mashamba and have found some open, uncultivated land.  
Who would you go to make it your mashamba?  Why? 
 
How did that person achieve their position of authority? 
 
Why should their decision be obeyed? 
 
What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community 
authority has made? 
 
B.  A man agrees to help cultivate a crop in return for a share of the grain.  When the crop 
has been harvested, his partner refuses to give him a share of the grain.  Who should he 
go to to help resolve the issue?  Why? 
 
How did that person achieve their position of authority? 
 
Why should their decision be obeyed? 
 
What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community 
authority has made? 
 
 Scenario 2 (social issues):    
A.   A man has worked hard all his life, built a house for his wife and has land and he 
wants her to be able to stay in the house when he dies.  But if he dies first, her family will 
come, sell all the land and possessions and divide the profit among the family and then 
forces her to come live with them while they financially support her the rest of her life.  
The widow wants to respect her husbands wishes and stay on they land he owed and 
continue living there.  If you were the widow, what could you do?  Why? 
 
How did that person achieve their position of authority? 
 
Why should their decision be obeyed? 
 
What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community 
authority has made? 
 
B.   Your neighbor gets drunk and beats his children.  Once the child was beaten so bad 
he broke his leg and couldn’t go to school or work in the mashamba.  The relatives of the 
family live in another province. What can you do about it? 
 
How did that person achieve their position of authority? 
 
Why should their decision be obeyed? 
 
What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community 
authority has made? 
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 Scenario 3 (crime issues):    
A.  Someone stripped your fields at night and you know who it is.  What can/would you 
do about it?  Why? 
 
How did that person achieve their position of authority? 
 
Why should their decision be obeyed? 
 
What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community 
authority has made? 
 
B.  Who would you go to if you found out your neighbor beat his wife to death for being 
with another man?  Why? 
 
How did that person achieve their position of authority? 
 
Why should their decision be obeyed? 
 
What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or community 
authority has made? 
 
The purpose of these questions is to determine whether there is a plurality of 
authority figures they consider legitimate and why they are legitimate (i.e. they are 
effective, “we always go to them with issues like this”, the government has appointed 
that person to deal with the issue, etc).  For each scenario, they were asked to 
essentially go up the ‘chain of command’ of authorities/problem solving bodies until 
they reach a traditional authority and/or government figure.  
 
If interviewees cannot respond to the question “How did that person achieve their 
position of authority,” offer the following options. 
 a.  They are a member of a family that has always had the responsibility of 
making those  sorts of decisions. 
b.  My community decided that it would be their responsibility to address that 
issue and make the final decision. 
c.  The government said they are in charge of addressing those issues.   
d.   They were elected. 
e.  Don’t know. 
f.  No response. 
 
If there is no tension and the interviewee/interviewer is comfortable, ask the following 
question:  What if their decision conflicts with the decision the government and/or 
community authority has made? 
 
10.  Can community authorities be elected? 
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11.   Do you think community authorities should be elected? 
    
12.   Did you know that the government has a law that gives community authorities 
governmental responsibilities such as taxation, justice enforcement, policing and land 
allocation?  
 ‘Community authority’ is the government definition of what is commonly 
known as traditional authority.  The point of this question is to help discern whether 
or not they perceive traditional authorities to be legitimate because the government 
has stated it is a formal structure of the state or if they perceive them to be 
legitimate because they believe traditional authorities are inherently legitimate.  The 
answer to this question must be framed in response to questions directed at who 
solves the community’s problems.  It will also determine whether or not other 
traditional authorities aside from the official ‘community authorities’ are 
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APPENDIX B.  EXPLANATION OF TERMS 
Bairro – areas where most residents of the city reside.  Houses are generally constructed 
in the traditional manner on small plots of land close together.  The roads are narrow and 
not paved.   
 
Cabo -  a traditional authority under the authority of the régulo.  A régulo’s territory may 
be divided between several cabos.   
 
Cidade cimento – literally “cement city.”  Section of the city, originally developed during 
colonial times, where all edifices are built of cement and roads are mostly paved. 
 
Comportamento -  Portuguese word for behavior, disposition, or conduct.  Focus group 
participants frequently expressed that it was important for them to know the 
comportamento of their leaders. 
 
Jovem – Portuguese word for youth.  In Africa, it is used broadly to define those 
generally between the ages of 15-30. 
 
Mambo – Term used mostly by Renamo to identify traditional authorities and chiefs. 
 
Mashamba – garden or small farm cultivated by the family for subsistence.  
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